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(a), under the doctrine announced in the
Tucker case, supra, is applicable to such

facts.
Petitioner's application for relief under
rule 31(a) is granted, and the Clerk of the
Superior Court for the City and County
of San Francisco is directed to file the
notice of appeal heretofore received by
him and to proceed with the preparation of
the record on appeal.

TRAYNOR, C. J., and McCOMB,
TOBRINER, PEEK and SCHAUER,- JJ.,
concur.

41 Cal.Rptr. 284
The PEOPLE. Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Monroe Smith HALL, Defendant

and Appellant.

Cr. 7963.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Nov. 25, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 23. 1964.

Defendant was convicted before the Su~
perior Court, Los Angeles County, Richard
F. C. Hayden, J., of second-degree murder,

and he appealed.

The Supreme Court,
held that error, if any, in

Traynor, C. J.,
admitting testimony concerning alleged
statement of defendant that he had washed
his shoes was harmless, but that evidence
was insufficient to sustain conviction.
Judgment reversed.
McComb and Schauer, JJ., dissented.

Opinion, CaI.App., 37 Cal.Rptr. 686,
vacated.
I. Arresl €=o63(4)

Officer has reasonable cause for arrest
if he is aware of facts that would lead man

of ordinary care and prudence conscien·
tiously to have strong suspicion tha~ accused
is guilty of felony. West's Ann.Pen.Code,
§ 836.
2. Arresl €=o63(4)

Although facts necessary to establish
reasonable cause for arrest must incline
mind to believe, they may leave some room
for doubt. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 836.
3. Arresl €=o63(4)

Officers who learned that homicide victim had addressed her assailant by name and
that defendant was only person of that name
that victim kne\v, and who knew that defendant had criminal record including COllviction for assault with deadly weapon had
reasonable cause to arrest defendant wl(hout warrant. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 2·~5,
836.
4. Criminal Law

~394.1(3)

Violation of statute requiring arresting
officers to inform defendant of reason for
his arrest is not ground for excluding evidence obtained after otherwise lawful arrest. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 841.
5. Criminal Law _¢:::::l394.1(3)

Violation of statute requiring officers to
take defendant before magistrate within two
days after arrest does not require exclusion
of evidence as consequence of such violation. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 825.
6. Criminal Law €=o1144(13)

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence,
Appellate Court must assume in favor of
verdict existence of every fact that trier of
fact could reasonably deduce from evidence
and then determine whether or not reasonable trier of fact could find defendant g11ilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
7. Criminal Law ¢:::::l1159(2)

Implicit in Appellate Court's duty to
determine legal sufficiency of evidence to
sustain verdict is court's obligation, in proper case, to appraise sufficiency and effect of
admitted or otherwise indubitably established facts as precluding or overcoming,

.,. Retired Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council
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as matter of law, inconsistent inferences
sought to be derived from weak and incon~
elusive sources.

8. Criminal Law e=>1I69(12)
Error, if any, in admitting testimony
concerning alleged statement of defendant
that he had washed his shoes was harmless.
9. Criminal Law ¢;::)562

To justify criminal conviction, trier of
fact must be reasonably persuaded to near
certainty,
10. Homicide ¢;::)254

Evidence was insufficient to sustain con-

viction for second-degree murder.
Ann.Pen:Code, § 189.

West's

Don Edgar Burris and E. V. Cavanagh,
Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch,
Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty.
Gen., and Gordon Ringer, Deputy Atty.
Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

TRAYNOR; Chief Justice.
Defendant was charged by information
with murder.1 (Pen. Code, § 187.) He
waived a jury trial, and the court found him
guilty of murder in the second degree.
(Pen.Code, § 189.) He appeals from the
judgment 2 on the ground that the evidence
is insufficient to support it.
Just before noon on Saturday, May 19,
1962, a resident of a one-story hotel in Los
Angeles noticed blood at various points
along the hallway. He pushed open the
door of the-kitchen used by all the residents
of the hotel and, without entering, saw
Ethel Mae Johnson lying in blood on the
floor. He went to the porch and asked a
passing female neighbor to call the police.
I. The information nlso charged him with
three prior felony convictions. He admitted them at trial.
2. Defendant's appeal from the order denying a new trial is dismissed. ,(Pen. Code,
§ 1237, subd. 2.)
396P.2d-16

When officers from the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Office arrived, they found the decedent nude with a curtain rod and cloth
loosely wrapped around her neck and a
bloody rag across her midsection. She had
been stabbed 49 times.
There was a considerable amount of blood
in the kitchen, two spots in an adjacent
room that the decedent shared with her lover, a trail of blood leading diagonally across
the hall, and blood smears elsewhere on the
floor and walls of the hallway. The investigating officers noticed two soleprints and
two heelprints made by a man's shoes in the
blood near the body. They also found the
kitchen window broken through, the window
screen pushed out: some broken glass, and a
bloody handprint on the wall just outside
the window. A bloodstained man's glove
lay on the kitchen floor. Its mate was found
across the hall in a room that the decedent
sometimes occupied.

[1-3] Two residents of the hotel told
the officers that while in bed earlier that
morning they heard the decedent's voice and
the sounds of a "commotion." Her words
suggested to them that she was in imminent
danger of being "cut" by a person she seemed to be addressing as "Monroe." II~ter~
views with others closely associated \vith
the decedent tended to indicate that defendant, Monroe Hall, was the only Monroe
that the decedent knew. He had lived at
the hotel and was an old friend of the man
with whom she lived. Defendant had a
criminal record that included a conviction
for assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen.
Code, § 245.) Although· no one had seen
him near the premises for at least two
weeks, including the day of the killing, the
investigating officers teletyped their information to the Los Angeles Police Department and asked for his arrest. 3
3. Defendant contends that his arrest with-

out a warrant was illegnl on the ground
that it was mnde without reasonable
cause (Pen.Code, § 836) and that evidence obtained from him nfter his arrest
was therefore inadmissible. It is true
thnt the officers learned tbnt the decedent
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At 9 :30 that evening, officers of the Los
Angeles Police Department, without a war~
rant (Pen.Code, § 836), accosted defendant
on the street. I-Ie cooperated fully, The
arresting officers handcuffed him and took
him to the 77th Street Police Station for
booking. Defendant's testimony that after
the booking he requested and was denied
permission to call a lawyer was uncontradicted. 4 The police then transferred him to
the Firestone Sheriff's Station where Sergeants Collins and Thornton, who had investigated the crime, took charge.

The sergeants noticed a brown splotch on
the bottom of defendant's right' shoe. Both
shoes were removed and given to chemical
experts who performed benzidine tests for
the presence of blood. Parts of three spots
removed from the arca where the instep
meets the heel reacted positively to the
benzidine. Only one spot was identifiable
as human blood, but there was' not enough
of it to permit the blood type to be ascertained. Although one chemist testified that
the spots appeared to be fresh, no test was
made to determine their age. Detailed
visual examinations and further benzidine
tests made directly on the bottoms of the
shoes failed to disclose any other traces of

blood.
Sergeant Collins also noted that the instep areas of the soles of both shoes looked
unusually scrubbed and whitened. (At the
trial, the judge examined the shoes closely
and noticed, in addition' to their scrubbed
appearance, a blackening on the whitened
areas.) Although Sergeant Collins menmay have been n prostitute who might
have known another Monroe. An officer
bas rensonable cause for an arrest, however, if he is aware of facts thnt would
lend a man of ordinary care and prudence
conscientiously to have n strong suspicion tbat the accused is guilty of n
felony. (People v. Fischer, 4t) Ca1.2d
442, 446. 317 P.2d 967.) The facts must
incline the mind to believe, but they may
leave some room for doubt. (People v.
Ingle, 53 Ca1.2d 407, 413, 2 Ca1.Rptr.
14, 348 P.2d 577.)
These standards
were met in this case.
4. A violation of a defendant's statutory
right to call a lawyer subjects the officer

tioned his observations to the chemists, they
made no tests to determine what caused the
discoloration. The chemists observed glass
fragments in the sales of the shoes, but
specific gravity tests showed no similarity
between these fragments and glass found at
the scene of the crime. In addition to these
tests, the police took photographs of two
scratches on defendant's face.
[4,5] At 2:30 a. m., without telling defendant that he had a right to remain silent,
Sergeants Collins and Thornton began to
question him. At some point during the
interrogation defendant was informed, apparently for the first time,1S that he was being charged with the murder. He related in
some detail his activities on the Saturday of
the killing. Asked about the condition of
his shoes, he expla.ined their clean apr:earance by referring to a walk on damp grass,
and a shine and cleaning earlier that ~:ve
ning. He could only speculate that shaving
cuts might have caused the spots of blolJd.
At the trial Sergeant Collins testified that
defendant also said that he had washed his
shoes with Clorox. At 3 :07 a. m., when
questioning continued in the presence of a
reporter, however, defendant denied having
scrubbed his shoes. In his transcribed statement he admitted knowing the decedent but
denied stabbing her. After the interrogation the police kept defendant in custody
and did not take him before a magistrate
until the following Wednesday.6
At the trial, the two men who overheard
the sounds of the crime said that they had
gone to bed only a few hours earlier that
responsible to a misdemeanor charge.
(Pen.Code, § 851.5, subd. (b).)
5. The nrresting officers violated section
841 of the PennI Coue if they faned to
inform defendant of the renson for his
urrest. (Cf. Willson v. Superior Court,
46 Ca1.2d 291, 294, 294 P.2d 36. where
the arrest took place during the criminal
act.) Such a violation, however, i8 not
a ground for excluding evidence obtained
after an otherwise lawful arrest. (See
People v. Maddox, 46 Cn1.2d 301, 305,
294 P.2d 6.)
6. By failing to take defendant before a
magistrate "within two days after bis
arrest, excluding Sundays nnd holidays"
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morning after a long night of gambling and
drinking. They made no effort to investigate any of these sounds when they heard
them. Shortly thereafter, on leaving the
hotel, they noticed bloodstains in the hallway and heard nois'!s in the bathroom, but
again made no effort to sec what might have
happened. Instead, they Vlent out for more
liquor. Only when they heard sirens did
they return to the premises to speak with
the police.
One of these witnesses testified to hearing the decedent utter six statements over
a period of about fifteen minutes. The first
four seemed to come from near the front
door. "Wait a minute. I am going with
you." "I am not going to tell the police
anything about you," "Did he send you
down here to do this to me?" "Here he
come now for rea1." The other two seemed
to come from the kitcjIen. "Monroe, don't
kill me." 'jDon't cut my baby/' This witness admitted that he could not be sure of
the order in which the statements were
made.
The other witness, awakened by the former, heard fewer statements. His testimony suggests that he heard the last two
utterances. His report, however, differs
both as to their probabJe locale and their
content. According to this witness, the decedent was in the hallway and said: I<Mon_
roe, don't cut me. I will tell him I fell out
of the bed." uMonroe, don't kill my baby."
Both witnesses were certain that the decedent said I<my baby" and not u me , baby,"
a!though there is no evidence that the decedent had a baby and there is evidence that
she was not pregnant. They also agree that
they heard only the decedent's voice, that
she spoke in a conversational tone, and that
the sounds of a struggle were audible.
Neither witness was sure whether the decedent uttered j'Monroe" at the beginning
(Pen.Code, § 825), the officers exceeded
the maximum period during which a defendaDt may be lawfully detained. California law, however, does not require the
exclusion of evidence as a consequence of
such n violation. (Rogers v. Superior

or at the end of the statements in which she
used the name. The testimony of each was
inconsistent in particulars with statements
each had made to the police on the day of
the killing.
Other witnesses testified that, although
the decedent had expressed some disapproval of defendant on one or two occasions,
she was not afraid of him, and that he had
not threatened her. No one knew if defendant had any romantic interest in her.
Defendant took the stand and told substantial1y the same story of his activities
on the Saturday in question that he had
given to the interrogating officers. Other
witnesses corroborated defendant's testimony in many details.
At the close of the trial the prosecution
revealed that a police search "of defendant's
·apartment turned up no damaging evidence.
[6,7] We agree with defendant's contention that the evidence is insufficient to
support the judgment. In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence an appellate
coc.rt I<must assume in favor of the verdict
the existence of every fact that the [trier
of fact] could reasonably deduce from the
evidence and then determine whether or
not a reasonable [trier of fact] could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." (People v. Huizenga, 34 Ca1.2d 669,
676, 213 P.2d 710, 713; accord People v.
Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 93, 10 Cal.Rptr.
167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086.)
"Implicit in our duty to determine the legal
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict
is our obligation, in a proper case, to appraise the sufficiency and effect of admitted
or otherwise indubitably established facts
as precluding or overcoming, as a matter
of law, inconsistent inferences sought to be
derived from weak and inconclusive
sources." (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 70,
153 P.2d 21, 27; see Jaffe, Judicial Review:
Court, 46 Cal.2d 3. 10. 291 P.2d 929;
cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332. 63 S.Ot. G08. 87 L.Ed. 819; MoIlo,y
v. United States. 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct.
1356, 1 L.E«.2d 1479.)
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Question of Fact, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 1020,
1026-31.)
The evidence against defendant, standing
alone, lacks substantial probative value.
The decedent's use of the name "Monroe"
is inconclusive. Although witnesses testified that defendant was the only Monroe
that the decedent knew, she had been convicted of narcotics addiction, prostitution,
and soliciting, and it was therefore likely
that she had a wide and private circle of
acquaintances. Moreover, as noted above,
neither witness was certain whether she
used the name at the beginning or the end
of the statements in question. Thus, even
if she knew no other Monroe, the testimony
concernmg her utterances leaves open the
substantial possibility that she was naming
him in answer to inquiries or accusations
by her assailant rather than as her assailant.
The blood on defendant's shoes is likewise unconvincing. One of the chemical
experts conceded that the spots could have
been "more than a week old, or less than
a week old." One spot was identifiable as
human blood, but since the chemists could
not ascertain the blood type, there is no
evidence connecting the spot with the decedent.
[8] The fact that defendant may have
said that he washed his shoes is equivocal
at best.' There are many reasons for
cleaning shoes, even with a bleaching agent.
The so-called scrubbed appearance of the
whitened instep areas of the soles adds little
more. Since the whiteness was confined to
the instep, it would seem that no attempt
7. Since nO one informed him of his right to
remain silent and he was deni~ counsel
during interrogation, evidence of the alleged statement may have been inadmissible at the trial. (Escobedo v. Illinois.

378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.
2d 977.) In the course of denying a
motion for a new trial, howeve~, the trial
judge said: "There was no testimony by
any person that they had, in fnct, been
scrubbed. The impact was solely that I
looked at them. • • • The shoes had
this very scrubbed nppearance, and that
is what""':'not any person's testimony
about it. but the fact that they were so

was made to clean other parts of the shoes.
Yet a man's footprints were found in the
blood on the kitchen floor, and there is evidence that no one entered the kitchen between the time of the killing and the arrival
of the police. One would therefore expect
to find traces of blood in the threads and
crevices of the soles of defendant's shoes.
That expectation would be enhanced had
the shoes been scrubbed, because scrubbing
would tend to spread rather than localize
the blood. Although the chemists made
detailed examinations, they found no such
traces. Moreover, even when thorough
cleaning attempts are made, the sensitive
benzidine test is capable of detecting minute
quantities of remaining blood. (People v.
Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 726, 31 Cal.Rptr.
225, 382 P.2d 33; People v. Schiers, 160
Cal.App.2d 364, 368, 324 P.2d 981, 329 P.2d
1.) The appearance of the whitened areas
of defendant's shoes suggests that if he
tried to clean them, he was certainly less
than thorough. Yet when the chemists
performed benzidine tests directly on these
areas, they obtained negative results.
It is possible to speculate that the blackening on the whitened surfaces resulted
from defendant's attempt to obscure the
effects of the cleaning process. The original areas covered by the whiteness are
still easily identifiable, however, and most
of the blackening is present on the instep
that was noticeably less affected by the
original discoloration.

The scratches on defendant's face add
nothing. No skin was found under the descrubbed with their appearance at the
time tha t he was taken, and the factwell, really the fact that they were
scrubbed, not the fact that anyone said
anything about them. The question of
whether it was said, that simply tends
to tie it to the fact that they were, in
fact:, scrubbed when they were taken off
his feet. But, it is the scrubbing itself,
rather than what was said about it."
Bence the admission of testimony concerning the alleged statement was harmless. (Of. People v. Parham,' 60 Oal.2d
378, 386, 33 Cal.Rpt,. 497, 384 P.2d

1001.)
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c:edent's fingernails and there is no other
evidence that she scratched her assailant.
Even if the foregoing evidence, standing
alone, could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such a finding is
undermined by other undisputed evidence
and by the absence of evidence that would
normally be forthcoming.
The police found a man's shoeprints, including two heelprints, in the blood near
the body. Although one of defendant's
heels bears an unusual gash that might be
expected to show up in a print, there is no

evidence of such a gash in the heel print.
Further, chemical experts testified that the
glass lodged in the soles of defendant's
shoes was not similar to any glass found
near the broken window. The bloody hand~
print on the wall outside the window sug~
gests that decedent or her assailant should
have cuts on the hand or arms. Neither
the decedent nor defendant had such cuts.
Moreover, there is no evidence linking the
print itself to either person. Apparently
no fingerprints were discovered, and there
is no evidence connecting defendant with
the bloody glove on the kitchen floor or
the curtain rod wrapped around the dece~
dent's neck.
A police search of defendant's apart~
ment disclosed nothing that would connect
him with the bloody stabbing. There was
no testimony that defendant and deceased
were emotionally involved in any way, and
no other motive has been suggested for the
crime.
[9,10]

Every attempt to connect

de~

fendant with the details of the killing
failed.

To justify a criminal conviction,

8. Even if we could conclude tbat the
meager evidence presented was sufficient,
we might be compelled to reverse the
judgment on the ground that tbe police
disabled the prosecution from affording
defendant a fair trial. The police kept
him in custody for four days. denied his
request for counsel, and failed to make
tests that might have been probative of
innocence or guilt \Vhether or not due
process requires a reasonably complete
. investigation of a crime. it is doubtful
that a conviction can be upheld when an
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the trier of fact must be reasonably per~
suaded to a near certainty. The trier must
therefore have reasonably rejected all that
undermines confidence. This case presents
a mass of undisputed evidence and unex~
plained facts that destroys confidence in
any inference pointing to guilt. Each item
of evidence against defendant is so weak
and inconclusive that together they are inM
sufficient to constitute proof beyond a reaM

sonable doubt.The judgment is reversed.

PETERS, TOBRINER and PEEK,
and DOOLING,

J.,.

JJ.,

concur.

McCOMB, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. I do not believe that the foiN
lowing statement in the majority opinion
is an accurate statement of the law: "To
justify a criminal conviction, the trier of
fact must be reasonably persuaded to a near
certainty. The trier must therefore have
reasonably rejected all that undermines conN

fidence."

(Italics added.)

It is my understanding that in a criminal
case all that is necessary for a convictio!)"
is evidence that convinces the minds of
those charged with passing upon the facts,
and satisfies their consciences, that the defendant is guilty.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require proof to a mathematical certainty
or proof which excludes a possible doubt.
(Code Civ.Proc. § 1826.)
Section 1826 of the Code of Civil Pro~
cedure reads: "The law does not require
demonstration; that is, such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error,
inadequate investigation has produced
limited evidence and the police have ren~
dered the defendant powerless to provide
ex.culpatory evidence himself. (See In re
Imbler. 60 Cn1.2d 554, 567. 35 Ca1.Rptr.
293, 387 P.2d 6; People v. KUhon.
53 Cal.2d 748, 752-754, 3 Cal.Rot•• 1,
349 P.2d 673.)
• Retired Justice of the Supreme Court
sitting under nssignment by the Chairman
of the Judicial Council.
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produces absolute certainty; because such
proof is rarely possible. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." (Sec People v. Ah Sun, 160
Cal. 788, 791,118 P. 240; People v. Brotherton, 47 Cal. 388, 406.)
I would affirm the judgment for the rea-

tioning of defendant, and the subsequent
search and seizure disclosing contraband
in his possession was invalid.
Affirmed
McComb and Schauer, JJ., dissented.
Opinion, CaI.App., 39 Cal.Rptr. 421,
vacated.

sons' expressed by Mr. Justice Files in the
opinion prepared by him for the District
Court of Appeal in People v. Han (Cal.
App.) 37 Cal.Rptr. 686. (See also Witkin,
Cal. Evidence (1958) § 123, p. 148.)

SCHAUER,

J.,*

concurs.

Rehearing denied; McCOMB, J" dissenting, MOSK, ]., not participating.

o

i, K::':""",,""";;"''"' -;;'' ' ' '

41 Cal.Rptr. 290
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
WIlliam REULMAN, Defendant and
Respondent;

One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, License No. CCB
205, Serial No. 60 G 024889, Defendant.
L. A. 28056.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.

Nov. 25, 1964.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1964.

Proceeding to forfeit automobile alleged to have been used in unlawful transportation of marijuana. The Superior
Court, Los Angeles County, Ben Koenig,
J., entered a judgment denying forfeiture
and the People appealed. The Supreme
Court, Peek, J., held that police officers
who observed only that defendant was
nervous, that he had parked his automobile
adjacent to point where narcotic user's kit
had been found and that thereafter he took
a rather aimless walk in the vicinity had
no reasonable cause for detention and ques-

I. Judgment

~559·

Dismissal of charges of possession of
marijuana on ground that only incrim"inating evidence was product of an unlawful
search and seizure did not bar redetermination of propriety of arrest, search and
seizure in proceedings to forfeit automobile alleged to have been used in unlawful
transportation of marijuana, although real
party in interest was the same. Vv'est's
Ann.Health & Safety Code, § 11610;
West's Ann.Pcn.Code, § 995.
2. Municipal Corporations €=189(1)

Police officer in discharge of duties
may detain and question a person when
circumstances are such as would indicate
to a reasonable man in like position that
sllch course is necessary to proper discharge
of those duties.
3. Arrest

~63(4),

71

Police officers who observed only that
defendant was nervous, that he had parked
his automobile adjacent to point where narcotic user's kit had been found and that
thereafter he took a rather aimless walk
in the vicinity had no reasonable cause for
detention and questioning of defendant, and
the subsequent search and seizure disclosing
contraband in his possession was invalid.
West's Ann.Health & Safety Code, § 11610;
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 995.
4. Forfeitures

~I,

5

Purpose of forfeiture of automobile
for. use in i11egal transportation of a narcotic is deterrent in nature and there is a
close identity to the aims and objectives of
criminal law enforcement so that the same
exclusionary rules should apply to improp-

• Retired Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Ju.dicial Council.

